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Je český vicepremiér Vondra americkým agentem?

2009-02-02T20:20:00.001+01:00

Je český vicepremiér Vondra americkým agentem?

4.12.2008 - Jan Tamáš

Ve výroční zprávě Bezpečnostní informační služby (BIS) za rok 2007 (viz http://www.bis.cz/n/2008-09-25-vyrocni-zprava-2007.html ) se oddíl 1.3 věnuje kontrarozvědné činnosti, tedy popisu činnosti cizích zpravodajských služeb na našem území. Pozorný čtenář si nemůže nevšimnout, že se tento oddíl věnuje jedné jediné zemi: Ruské federaci. Jakoby snad na českém území operovali zpravodajci jediné země světa – absurdní představa.

Člověk nemusí být zrovna expert na zpravodajskou činnost, aby si uvědomil, že obzvlášť teď, tedy v době strategického jednání o umístění trvalé vojenské základny USA na našem území, zde budou působit zpravodajci minimálně ještě jedné země: USA. O těch ale zpráva BIS mlčí. Stejně tak jako o zpravodajcích francouzských, čínských, anglických, německých či dalších. Proč? Je to snad tím, že byla dělána na politickou zakázku a jejím cílem nebylo objektivně informovat o činnosti BIS, ale vystrašit lidi starým osvědčeným strašákem – Ruskem? Ve snaze zlomit odpor většiny Čechů, Moravanů a Slezanů proti trvalému pobytu amerických vojsk na našem území?

Odpověď přichází z míst, kde by ji čekal asi málokdo: z české vlády.
V uplynulých zhruba dvou letech se ke mně opakovaně dostala informace, která mě v počátku šokovala. Říkala, že vicepremiér naší vlády Alexandr Vondra je americkým agentem. Zdálo se mi to natolik absurdní, že jsem této zprávě nevěnoval žádnou pozornost. S postupem času se ale množily zdroje, odkud se ke mně zpráva dostávala, a někteří lidé dokonce mluvili tak, že „to přece ví každý“. Může na tom být něco pravdy? Kdo je vlastně Alexandr Vondra?

Na svých stránkách (viz http://alexandrvondra.cz/kdojsem.php ) kromě své základní biografie mimo jiné uvádí, že v roce 1999 obdržel medaili od National Endowment for Democracy (NED). Musí být na tuto medaili patřičně hrdý, je uvedená hned na prvním místě v jeho sekci „Ocenění a vyznamenání“. A co že je tato National Endowment for Democracy, neboli Národní nadace pro demokracii?

Jeden ze zakladatelů NED Allen Weinstein k její činnosti uvádí: „Mnoho z toho, co my [NED] dnes děláme, dělala před 25 lety tajně CIA“ (Blum, Rogue State: A Guide to the World's Only Superpower, 2000, str. 180). To je možná nejvýstižnější shrnutí. Obšírněji je pak činnost NED popsána přímo na webových stránkách organizace:

„Po druhé světové válce, čelíc hrozbám našich demokratických spojenců a bez jakéhokoli mechanizmu poskytování politické pomoci, se zákonodárci Spojených států uchýlili k utajeným způsobům, tajně vysílajíc poradce, vybavení a finance na podporu novin a politických stran, které byly v Evropě v ohrožení. Když bylo na konci 60. let odhaleno, že některé americké privátní dobrovolnické organizace byly skrytě financovány prostřednictvím CIA, aby vedly boj myšlenek na mezinárodních fórech, dospěla vláda prezidenta Johnsona k rozhodnutí, že takovéto financování by mělo přestat, a doporučila ustanovení ‘veřejno soukromého mechanizmu‘ k financování zahraničních aktivit otevřeně.“ (http://www.ned.org/about/nedhistory.html#origins)

V otevřené encyklopedii Wikipedia je dostatek příkladů, jak takové financování zahraničních skupin a politických stran prostřednictvím NED probíhá (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Endowment_for_Democracy). Obecně lze říci, že NED podporuje takové politické strany a kandidáty, kteří jsou nakloněni zájmům USA v dané zemi či regionu. Konkrétně to jsou často kandidáti se silnými vazbami na vojenskou oblast a tací, kteří podporují práva amerických společností investovat v daných zemí s minimálními omezeními. NED nepodporuje kandidáty, kteří se staví proti investicím amerických společností nebo ty, kdo slibují omezení práv investic těchto společností.

Český vicepremiér má ale na svém kontě víc „trofejí“. Další z nich je například členství v Trilaterální komisi (2005-2006). Tato soukromá organizace, jejíž vliv daleko přesahuje vliv mnoha národních vlád, včetně té české, a jejíž členové jsou nikoliv demokraticky voleni, ale jmenováni, je často považována za skupinu, jejímž cílem je vytvoření jedné světové vlády. Není zřejmě náhodou, že dnes v Trilaterální komisi místo Alexandra Vondry zasedá český ministr zahraničních věcí Karel Schwarzenberg (viz http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trilateral_Commission).
Kolik Čechů zná tyto zásadní informace? Kde jsou nezávislá média, aby na tyto skutečnosti poukázala? Jak to, že žádný novinář se pana Vondry na tyto skutečnosti neptá a nepožaduje vysvětlení?

Alexandr Vondra také spoluzakládal (spolu s dalším bývalým velvyslancem v USA – Michaelem Žantovským) PASS – Program of Atlantic Security Studies, takzvaný think-tank, jehož cílem je „identifikovat a analyzovat otázky a problémy zahraniční politiky a bezpečnosti v oblasti transatlantických vztahů a pomoci navrhnout praktická řešení a způsoby čelení těmto problémům“ (viz http://www.alexandrvondra.cz/media/PassFactsheet2005.pdf). Pod hlavičkou PASS organizoval současný český vicepremiér spolu s dalšími jeho členy konference, jejichž témata odpovídala širšímu zaměření PASS „na obecné perspektivy Atlantické vazby samotné. Současné Euro-Americké otázky a budoucnost NATO a budoucnost společné evropské bezpečnostní a obranné politiky jsou analyzovány směřujíce ke komplementárním a synergickým řešením, která by posílila transatlantickou vazbu“. Po ořezání všech zbytečných slov kolem zůstává jasno: cílem PASS bylo posilování „transatlantické“ vazby a vytváření takové evropské zahraniční a bezpečnostní politiky, která by tuto vazbu posílila (a nikoliv naopak). (Program PASS byl sice v roce 2005 ukončen, byl však okamžitě nahrazen institutem Prague Security Studies Institute. Jména se mění, cíle zůstávají stejné.)

Je zjevné, že tato „transatlantická“ vazba bude tím silnější, čím silnější bude závislost Evropy na USA. A naopak, čím nezávislejší bude Evropa na USA, tím slabší bude tato vazba. Ona vicepremiérem tak opěvovaná „vazba“ totiž není ničím jiným než poutem, kterým je EU připoutána k USA. Jak jinak si lze vysvětlit skutečnost, že Česká vláda prosazuje umístění americké vojenské základny v Brdech zcela bez diskuze na půdě Evropské unie?

Čí zájmy tedy hájí český vicepremiér? Zájmy občanů České republiky? Nebo zájmy mezinárodních polotajných uskupení s neznámými cíli, často však přímo napojenými na vysoké politické, vojenské a finanční činitele USA? Je tedy snad opravdu pravda, že pracuje nikoliv pro českou vládu, ale že že jeho skutečným zaměstnavatelem je prostřednictvím krycích organizací přímo americká CIA? Jeho chování (stejně tak jako chování jeho „kolegy“ Schwarzenberga) v otázce umístění americké vojenské základny v ČR tomu nasvědčuje.

Stávající česká vláda dělá z České republiky trojského koně v Evropské unii, neboť prosazuje něco, proti čemu se dnes již otevřeně postavili prezident Francie, premiér Itálie, vrcholní představitelé Německa, Rakouska, Španělska a řady dalších evropských zemí.

V tomto světle se již nedivím, že výroční zpráva BIS nehovoří o působení CIA na území České republiky.

A jak se k celé této záležitosti postaví členové ODS na víkendovém kongresu? Dopustí, aby jejich strana i nadále poškozovala zájmy České republiky a zájmy Evropské unie ve prospěch „transatlantické vazby“? Ponechají i nadále svou stranu v rukou, které již dokázaly, že „to nedokážou“? Dopustí, aby ODS odpadla na smetiště dějin a byla nahrazena jinou, odvážnější a sebevědomější stranou, v jejímž čele nebudou působit lidé, kteří se chovají jako agenti cizích mocností?

Jan Tamáš

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Navy agrees to camouflage 'swastika' base

2008-07-21T06:44:00.001+02:00

Dan Glaister in Los Angeles
Thursday September 27, 2007
The Guardian

Painting a swastika on a public building is a hate crime. But what happens when the building itself is the swastika? While appearing innocuous from the ground, the striking shape of a construction in San Diego, now on view to internet users accessing Google Earth, is unmistakable - it resembles the Nazi symbol.

Ground-breaking began for the six-building complex at the Coronado US navy base in southern California in 1967. While the original plans called for two central buildings and a single L-shaped barracks, Naval Amphibious Base Complex 320-325 evolved in design. By the time it was finished in 1970 it had four L-shaped buildings - set at right angles. That was when the problem was spotted.

The scheme's architect, John Mock, said this week that while he was aware of the shape as viewed from above he did not think it a true swastika. "We knew what it was going to look like, but it isn't that. It's four L-shaped buildings ... looking at it from the ground or the air, it still is."

Forgotten about after the initial controversy, the buildings' form has emerged again as an issue thanks to the internet and Google Earth. It has led an unlikely alliance - of bloggers, anti-discrimination activists, lawmakers and one talk-radio host - to take action. And now the navy has added $600,000 (£300,000) to its 2008 budget for camouflage. Landscaping, rock structures and solar panels should help disguise its shape.

"We take this very seriously," said Scott Sutherland, deputy public affairs officer for the Navy Region Southwest. "We don't want to be associated with something as symbolic and hateful as a swastika."

But the remedy may not stop conspiracy theorists. The buildings, surmise some bloggers, were put up by German POWs as a Hitler tribute. Others say that nearby buildings look like planes pointing at the swastika. One theory has it that, sideways, the buildings resemble Calvary crosses. And the crosses point to Jerusalem.

Blogged with the Flock Browser

Believe in truth..

2008-01-25T22:36:00.001+01:00

..and democracy for all!!

2008-01-25T22:21:00.001+01:00

H. R. 1955 (Referred-in-Senate)

2007-12-03T16:42:00.000+01:00

110th CONGRESS
1st Session

Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

H. R. 1955

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATESOctober 24, 2007

AN ACT

To prevent homegrown terrorism, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the “Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism Prevention Act of 2007”.

2. PREVENTION OF VIOLENT RADICALIZATION AND HOMEGROWN TERRORISM.

(a) In general.—Title VIII of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 361 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new subtitle:

“subtitle J—Prevention of violent radicalization and homegrown terrorism

899A. DEFINITIONS.

“For purposes of this subtitle:

“(1) Commission.—The term ‘Commission’ means the National Commission on the Prevention of Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism established under section 899C.

“(2) Violent radicalization.—

“The term ‘violent radicalization’ means the process of adopting or promoting an extremist belief system for the purpose of facilitating ideologically based violence to advance political, religious, or social change.

“(3) Homegrown terrorism.—

“The term ‘homegrown terrorism’ means the use, planned use, or threatened use, of force or violence by a group or individual born, raised, or based and operating primarily within the United States or any possession of the United States to intimidate or coerce the United States government, the civilian population of the United States, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.

“(4) Ideologically based violence.—

“The term ‘ideologically based violence’ means the use, planned use, or threatened use of force or violence by a group or individual to promote the group or individual’s political, religious, or social beliefs.

899B. FINDINGS.

“The Congress finds the following:

“(1) The development and implementation of methods and processes that can be utilized to prevent violent radicalization, homegrown terrorism, and ideologically based violence in the United States is critical to combating domestic terrorism.

“(2) The promotion of violent radicalization, homegrown terrorism, and ideologically based violence exists in the United States and poses a threat to homeland security.

“(3) The Internet has aided in facilitating violent radicalization, ideologically based violence, and the homegrown terrorism process in the United States by providing access to broad and constant streams of terrorist-related propaganda to United States citizens.

“(4)

“While the United States must continue its vigilant efforts to combat international terrorism, it must also strengthen efforts to combat the threat posed by homegrown terrorists based and operating within the United States.

“(5) Understanding the motivational factors that lead to violent radicalization, homegrown terrorism, and ideologically based violence is a vital step toward eradicating these threats in the United States.

“(6) Preventing the potential rise of self radicalized, unaffiliated terrorists domestically cannot be easily accomplished solely through traditional Federal intelligence or law enforcement efforts, and can benefit from the incorporation of State and local efforts.

“(7) Individuals prone to violent radicalization, homegrown terrorism, and ideologically based violence span all races, ethnicities, and religious beliefs, and individuals should not be targeted based solely on race, ethnicity, or religion.

“(8) Any measure taken to prevent violent radicalization, homegrown terrorism, and ideologically based violence and homegrown terrorism in the United States should not violate the constitutional rights, civil rights, or civil liberties of United States citizens or lawful permanent residents.

“(9)

“Certain governments, including the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia have significant experience with homegrown terrorism and the United States can benefit from lessons learned by those nations.

“SEC. 899C. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE PREVENTION OF VIOLENT RADICALIZATION AND IDEOLOGICALLY BASED VIOLENCE.

“(a) Establishment.—

“There is established within the legislative branch of the Government the National Commission on the Prevention of Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism.

“(b) Purpose.—

“The purposes of the Commission are the following:

“(1) Examine and report upon the facts and causes of violent radicalization, homegrown terrorism, and ideologically based violence in the United States, including United States connections to non-United States persons and networks, violent radicalization, homegrown terrorism, and ideologically based violence in prison, individual or ‘lone wolf’ violent radicalization, homegrown terrorism, and ideologically based violence, and other faces of the phenomena of violent radicalization, homegrown terrorism, and ideologically based violence that the Commission considers important.

“(2)

“Build upon and bring together the work of other entities and avoid unnecessary duplication, by reviewing the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of—

“(A)

“the Center of Excellence established or designated under section 899D, and other academic work, as appropriate;

“(B) Federal, State, local, or tribal studies of, reviews of, and experiences with violent radicalization, homegrown terrorism, and ideologically based violence; and

“(C)

“foreign government studies of, reviews of, and experiences with violent radicalization, homegrown terrorism, and ideologically based violence.

“(c) Composition of commission.—

“The Commission shall be composed of 10 members appointed for the life of the Commission, of whom—

“(1)

“one member shall be appointed by the President from among officers or employees of the executive branch and private citizens of the United States;

“(2)

“one member shall be appointed by the Secretary;

“(3)

“one member shall be appointed by the majority leader of the Senate;

“(4)

“one member shall be appointed by the minority leader of the Senate;

“(5)

“one member shall be appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives;

“(6)

“one member shall be appointed by the minority leader of the House of Representatives;

“(7)

“one member shall be appointed by the Chairman of the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives;

“(8)

“one member shall be appointed by the ranking minority member of the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives;

“(9)

“one member shall be appointed by the Chairman of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate; and

“(10)

“one member shall be appointed by the ranking minority member of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate.

“(d) Chair and Vice Chair.—

“The Commission shall elect a Chair and a Vice Chair from among its members.

“(e) Qualifications.—Individuals shall be selected for appointment to the Commission solely on the basis of their professional qualifications, achievements, public stature, experience, and expertise in relevant fields, including, but not limited to, behavioral science, constitutional law, corrections, counterterrorism, cultural anthropology, education, information technology, intelligence, juvenile justice, local law enforcement, organized crime, Islam and other world religions, sociology, or terrorism.

“(f) Deadline for Appointment.—

“All members of the Commission shall be appointed no later than 60 days after the date of enactment of this subtitle.

“(g) Quorum and meetings.—

“The Commission shall meet and begin the operations of the Commission not later than 30 days after the date on which all members have been appointed or, if such meeting cannot be mutually agreed upon, on a date designated by the Speaker of the House of Representatives. Each subsequent meeting shall occur upon the call of the Chair or a majority of its members. A majority of the members of the Commission shall constitute a quorum, but a lesser number may hold meetings.

“(h) Authority of individuals to act for Commission.—

“Any member of the Commission may, if authorized by the Commission, take any action that the Commission is authorized to take under this Act.

“(i) Powers of commission.—

“The powers of the Commission shall be as follows:

“(1) In general.—

“(A) Hearings and evidence.—

“The Commission or, on the authority of the Commission, any subcommittee or member thereof, may, for the purpose of carrying out this section, hold hearings and sit and act at such times and places, take such testimony, receive such evidence, and administer such oaths as the Commission considers advisable to carry out its duties.

“(B) Contracting.—

“The Commission may, to such extent and in such amounts as are provided in appropriation Acts, enter into contracts to enable the Commission to discharge its duties under this section.

“(2) Information from Federal agencies.—

“(A) In general.—The Commission may request directly from any executive department, bureau, agency, board, commission, office, independent establishment, or instrumentality of the Government, information, suggestions, estimates, and statistics for the purposes of this section. The head of each such department, bureau, agency, board, commission, office, independent establishment, or instrumentality shall, to the extent practicable and authorized by law, furnish such information, suggestions, estimates, and statistics directly to the Commission, upon request made by the Chair of the Commission, by the chair of any subcommittee created by a majority of the Commission, or by any member designated by a majority of the Commission.

“(B) Receipt, handling, storage, and dissemination.—The Committee and its staff shall receive, handle, store, and disseminate information in a manner consistent with the operative statutes, regulations, and Executive orders that govern the handling, storage, and dissemination of such information at the department, bureau, agency, board, commission, office, independent establishment, or instrumentality that responds to the request.

“(j) Assistance from Federal agencies.—

“(1) General services administration.—

“The Administrator of General Services shall provide to the Commission on a reimbursable basis administrative support and other services for the performance of the Commission’s functions.

“(2) Other departments and agencies.—

“In addition to the assistance required under paragraph (1), departments and agencies of the United States may provide to the Commission such services, funds, facilities, and staff as they may determine advisable and as may be authorized by law.

“(k) Postal services.—

“The Commission may use the United States mails in the same manner and under the same conditions as departments and agencies of the United States.

“(l) Nonapplicability of Federal Advisory Committee Act.—

“The Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) shall not apply to the Commission.

“(m) Public meetings.—

“(1) In general.—

“The Commission shall hold public hearings and meetings to the extent appropriate.

“(2) Protection of information.—Any public hearings of the Commission shall be conducted in a manner consistent with the protection of information provided to or developed for or by the Commission as required by any applicable statute, regulation, or Executive order including subsection (i)(2)(B).

“(n) Staff of Commission.—

“(1) Appointment and compensation.—

“The Chair of the Commission, in consultation with the Vice Chair and in accordance with rules adopted by the Commission, may appoint and fix the compensation of a staff director and such other personnel as may be necessary to enable the Commission to carry out its functions, without regard to the provisions of title 5, United States Code, governing appointments in the competitive service, and without regard to the provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of such title relating to classification and General Schedule pay rates, except that no rate of pay fixed under this subsection may exceed the maximum rate of pay for GS–15 under the General Schedule.

“(2) Staff expertise.—Individuals shall be selected for appointment as staff of the Commission on the basis of their expertise in one or more of the fields referred to in subsection (e).

“(3) Personnel as Federal employees.—

“(A) In general.—

“The executive director and any employees of the Commission shall be employees under section 2105 of title 5, United States Code, for purposes of chapters 63, 81, 83, 84, 85, 87, 89, and 90 of that title.

“(B) Members of commission.—

“Subparagraph (A) shall not be construed to apply to members of the Commission.

“(4) Detailees.—

“Any Federal Government employee may be detailed to the Commission without reimbursement from the Commission, and during such detail shall retain the rights, status, and privileges of his or her regular employment without interruption.

“(5) Consultant services.—

“The Commission may procure the services of experts and consultants in accordance with section 3109 of title 5, United States Code, but at rates not to exceed the daily rate paid a person occupying a position at level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, United States Code.

“(6) Emphasis on security clearances.—The Commission shall make it a priority to hire as employees and retain as contractors and detailees individuals otherwise authorized by this section who have active security clearances.

“(o) Commission personnel matters.—

“(1) Compensation of members.—Each member of the Commission who is not an employee of the government shall be compensated at a rate not to exceed the daily equivalent of the annual rate of basic pay in effect for a position at level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, for each day during which that member is engaged in the actual performance of the duties of the Commission.

“(2) Travel expenses.—

“While away from their homes or regular places of business in the performance of services for the Commission, members of the Commission shall be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, at rates authorized for employees of agencies under subchapter I of chapter 57 of title 5, United States Code, while away from their homes or regular places of business in the performance of services for the Commission.

“(3) Travel on Armed Forces conveyances.—Members and personnel of the Commission may travel on aircraft, vehicles, or other conveyances of the Armed Forces of the United States when such travel is necessary in the performance of a duty of the Commission, unless the cost of commercial transportation is less expensive.

“(4) Treatment of service for purposes of retirement benefits.—

“A member of the Commission who is an annuitant otherwise covered by section 8344 or 8468 of title 5, United States Code, by reason of membership on the Commission shall not be subject to the provisions of such section with respect to membership on the Commission.

“(5) Vacancies.—

“A vacancy on the Commission shall not affect its powers and shall be filled in the manner in which the original appointment was made. The appointment of the replacement member shall be made not later than 60 days after the date on which the vacancy occurs.

“(p) Security clearances.—The heads of appropriate departments and agencies of the executive branch shall cooperate with the Commission to expeditiously provide Commission members and staff with appropriate security clearances to the extent possible under applicable procedures and requirements.

“(q) Reports.—

“(1) Final report.—Not later than 18 months after the date on which the Commission first meets, the Commission shall submit to the President and Congress a final report of its findings and conclusions, legislative recommendations for immediate and long-term countermeasures to violent radicalization, homegrown terrorism, and ideologically based violence, and measures that can be taken to prevent violent radicalization, homegrown terrorism, and ideologically based violence from developing and spreading within the United States, and any final recommendations for any additional grant programs to support these purposes. The report may also be accompanied by a classified annex.

“(2) Interim reports.—

“The Commission shall submit to the President and Congress—

“(A)

“by not later than 6 months after the date on which the Commission first meets, a first interim report on—

“(i)

“its findings and conclusions and legislative recommendations for the purposes described in paragraph (1); and

“(ii) its recommendations on the feasibility of a grant program established and administered by the Secretary for the purpose of preventing, disrupting, and mitigating the effects of violent radicalization, homegrown terrorism, and ideologically based violence and, if such a program is feasible, recommendations on how grant funds should be used and administered; and

“(B)

“by not later than 6 months after the date on which the Commission submits the interim report under subparagraph (A), a second interim report on such matters.

“(3) Individual or dissenting views.—

“Each member of the Commission may include in each report under this subsection the individual additional or dissenting views of the member.

“(4) Public availability.—

“The Commission shall release a public version of each report required under this subsection.

“(r) Availability of funding.—

“Amounts made available to the Commission to carry out this section shall remain available until the earlier of the expenditure of the amounts or the termination of the Commission.

“(s) Termination of commission.—

“The Commission shall terminate 30 days after the date on which the Commission submits its final report.

899D. CENTER OF EXCELLENCE FOR THE STUDY OF VIOLENT RADICALIZATION AND HOMEGROWN TERRORISM IN THE UNITED STATES.

“(a) Establishment.—

“The Secretary of Homeland Security shall establish or designate a university-based Center of Excellence for the Study of Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism in the United States (hereinafter referred to as ‘Center’) following the merit-review processes and procedures and other limitations that have been previously established for selecting and supporting University Programs Centers of Excellence. The Center shall assist Federal, State, local and tribal homeland security officials through training, education, and research in preventing violent radicalization and homegrown terrorism in the United States. In carrying out this section, the Secretary may choose to either create a new Center designed exclusively for the purpose stated herein or identify and expand an existing Department of Homeland Security Center of Excellence so that a working group is exclusively designated within the existing Center of Excellence to achieve the purpose set forth in subsection (b).

“(b) Purpose.—

“It shall be the purpose of the Center to study the social, criminal, political, psychological, and economic roots of violent radicalization and homegrown terrorism in the United States and methods that can be utilized by Federal, State, local, and tribal homeland security officials to mitigate violent radicalization and homegrown terrorism.

“(c) Activities.—

“In carrying out this section, the Center shall—

“(1)

“contribute to the establishment of training, written materials, information, analytical assistance and professional resources to aid in combating violent radicalization and homegrown terrorism;

“(2)

“utilize theories, methods and data from the social and behavioral sciences to better understand the origins, dynamics, and social and psychological aspects of violent radicalization and homegrown terrorism;

“(3)

“conduct research on the motivational factors that lead to violent radicalization and homegrown terrorism; and

“(4)

“coordinate with other academic institutions studying the effects of violent radicalization and homegrown terrorism where appropriate.

899E. PREVENTING VIOLENT RADICALIZATION AND HOMEGROWN TERRORISM THROUGH INTERNATIONAL COOPERATIVE EFFORTS.

“(a) International effort.—The Secretary shall, in cooperation with the Department of State, the Attorney General, and other Federal Government entities, as appropriate, conduct a survey of methodologies implemented by foreign nations to prevent violent radicalization and homegrown terrorism in their respective nations.

“(b) Implementation.—To the extent that methodologies are permissible under the Constitution, the Secretary shall use the results of the survey as an aid in developing, in consultation with the Attorney General, a national policy in the United States on addressing radicalization and homegrown terrorism.

“(c) Reports to Congress.—The Secretary shall submit a report to Congress that provides—

“(1)

“a brief description of the foreign partners participating in the survey; and

“(2)

“a description of lessons learned from the results of the survey and recommendations implemented through this international outreach.

899F. PROTECTING CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES WHILE PREVENTING IDEOLOGICALLY BASED VIOLENCE AND HOMEGROWN TERRORISM.

“(a) In general.—

“The Department of Homeland Security’s efforts to prevent ideologically based violence and homegrown terrorism as described herein shall not violate the constitutional rights, civil rights, or civil liberties of United States citizens or lawful permanent residents.

“(b) Commitment to racial neutrality.—

“The Secretary shall ensure that the activities and operations of the entities created by this subtitle are in compliance with the Department of Homeland Security’s commitment to racial neutrality.

“(c) Auditing mechanism.—The Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Officer of the Department of Homeland Security shall develop and implement an auditing mechanism to ensure that compliance with this subtitle does not violate the constitutional rights, civil rights, or civil liberties of any racial, ethnic, or religious group, and shall include the results of audits under such mechanism in its annual report to Congress required under section 705.”.

(b) Clerical amendment.—

The table of contents in section 1(b) of such Act is amended by inserting at the end of the items relating to title VIII the following:

“Subtitle J—Prevention of violent radicalization and homegrown terrorism

“Sec. 899A. Definitions.

“Sec. 899B. Findings.

“Sec. 899C. National Commission on the Prevention of Violent Radicalization and Ideologically Based Violence.

“Sec. 899D. Center of Excellence for the Study of Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism in the United States.

“Sec. 899E. Preventing violent radicalization and homegrown terrorism through international cooperative efforts.

“Sec. 899F. Protecting civil rights and civil liberties while preventing ideologically based violence and homegrown terrorism.”.

Passed the House of Representatives October 23, 2007.

Attest:	lorraine c. miller,
	Clerk

110th CONGRESS
1st Session

H. R. 1955

AN ACT

To prevent homegrown terrorism, and for other purposes.